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This paper explains adverse international capital flows and economic growth 
using a model with asymmetric information in the capital market. The capital 
markets in developing countries are found to suffer more severely from 
asymmetric information than those in developed ones, which results in a lower 
rate of return on investment and severer credit rationing. Thus, capital flows from 
developing to developed countries, lowering the growth rate of the developing 
countries. 
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  1     Two important questions for developing countries are: do poor countries tend to grow 
faster than rich ones and does sufficient international capital flow from the developed 
countries to the developing countries? 
     Cross-section empirical research has shown that poor countries do not grow faster and, 
therefore, per capita income across countries do not exhibit convergence (Barro, 
1991).
1In addition, the magnitude of international capital flowing from developed to 
developing countries is less than that theoretically predicted by standard neoclassical 
theory (Lucas, 1990).  In fact, even adverse flows have been observed, for example, the 
capital flight from Latin America to the United States in the 1970s and the outflow of oil-
dollars from the Middle East to the Eurodollar market. 
     These two factors cannot be explained with standard neoclassical theory, and used to 
be called “puzzles”.  Recently, much research has been directed at explaining these 
findings concerning economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1990; Sala-i-Martin, 1990a, 
b) and international capital flows (Gertler and Rogoff, 1990; Lucas, 1990).  These 
models, however, examine and attempt to provide a theoretical rationalization for only 
one of these empirical findings. 
     In  contrast,  this  paper  develops a theoretical model which explain these two 
phenomena simultaneously by blending endogenous growth theory and the theory of 
imperfect capital markets (Williamson, 1986; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Levine, 1997; 
Von Thadden, 1995).  By developing a dynamic, two-country model based on 
Williamson (1986), the present research elucidates the relationship among credit 
rationing, international capital flows, and growth rates.  This paper differs from Hamada 
and Sakuragawa (1993) by developing a model that can also explain the fact that credit 
  2rationing is widely observed in developing countries (World Bank, 1989; McKinnon, 
1991). 
          The plan of the paper is as follows.  The framework of the employed model is 
explained in section I, while section II derives (i) the properties of the optimal contract; 
and (ii) the resultant equilibrium of the capital market associated with credit rationing.  In 
section III, the equilibria among all markets and the dynamics of the economy are 
examined and this is followed in section IV by the construction of a corresponding two-
country model.  Finally, some conclusions are presented. 
I. The Model 
† An overlapping-generations model based on Williamson’s (1986) static model is 
constructed.  The economy is comprised of individuals and firms.  In the first period, t=1, 
a set of initial old agents is present, and in each period t=1,2, ..., ∞ , a continuum of 
agents who live for two periods are born.   It is assumed that the population is constant, 
and that half are lenders and half are entrepreneurs.   
 
A. Lenders 
     Each lender is endowed with one unit of labor only in the first period of life.  During 
this period, each supplies his labor inelastically to firms and receives a wage wt .  
Although lenders can consume wt in both periods of their life, goods are perishable and 
require special investment technology to be carried over to the next period.  Since only 
entrepreneurs are endowed with investment technology, in order for lenders to consume 
goods in the second period, they must lend their goods to entrepreneurs in the first period 
and receive payment in the second period. 
  3    It is assumed that lenders are risk-neutral and maximize the expected value of their 
utility, Vcc e q t (,, ) 12 , where c1 and c  are, respectively, the consumption in the first and 
second period, and e   is the monitoring cost per unit of lending.  This assumption 
considerably simplifies the contracting problem because it enables the analysis of the effect of 
asymmetric information without a consideration of risk-sharing issues.  A lender’s utility 
function is given by  
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where ρ  is the rate of time preference, eqt   is the monitoring effort the lenders must 
expend upon entrepreneur default, and qt   is the amount of lending. To generate an 
upward-sloping supply curve for loanable funds, it is assumed that each lender has a 
different  and that the ρ   follows a uniform distribution over [0,  ρ ρ ] ( ρ  >  0).  
Consequently, only the “patient” lenders actually lend their goods to entrepreneurs and 
consume some goods in the second period.  These lenders are defined as those whose rate 
of time preference are lower than the expected rate of return from lending, r.  The other 
“impatient” lenders do not lend any goods to entrepreneurs, thus entirely consuming their 
wage in the first period.  If we were to select a lender at random, the probability that the 
lender actually lends goods, Pr[ρ< r ], can be expressed as  t+1
                   Pr[ρ< r ] = r ρ.  t+1 t+1
Therefore, a proportion rt+1 ρ of the lenders lend their earnings to entrepreneurs.  As a 
result, if the expected rate of return from lending increases, more lenders lend their goods 




  4B. Entrepreneurs      
     Entrepreneurs have zero endowments of goods and labor in both periods of their life.  
In the first period, however, each has access to one investment project yielding a random 
return in the second period, for example, if qt units of goods are invested, the project 
yields  q v t t ~
+1 units in the following period, where  ~ vt+1 is the random return per unit of 
investment.  It is assumed that: (i) the risk is idiosyncratic; (ii) ~ vt+1 follows a uniform 
distribution over [0, 2µ ]  (µ >1); and (iii) the ~ v  are independently and identically 
distributed across entrepreneurs.  Since entrepreneurs have no goods or labor in the first 
period, they must invest by borrowing goods from a lender.  A constraint is imposed so 
that an entrepreneur can only borrow from one lender. 
t+1
     In the second period, entrepreneurs become firm owners using their acquired q v t t ~
+1 
units of goods as capital.  After goods are produced by firms expending capital and labor, 
entrepreneurs receive q v t t ~
+1 ii   units of goods in this period as capital returns.  By 
assuming that capital does not depreciate during production, each entrepreneur acquires a 
total of q v i ~ ( + 1 ) +1  units of goods, which are subsequently either consumed or used to 
pay interest to their lender. 
t t t
          Since entrepreneurs only consume in the second period of life, they need only 
maximize their expected second period utility. They are assumed to be risk-neutral with 
respect to consumption realizations, and their corresponding utility is expressed as 
                             Uc ,      c () =
where c is consumption in the second period. 
 
C. Information Structure
  5    An  asymmetric  information  structure  is assumed regarding the outcome of risky 
investment projects.   The realization of ~ vt+1, denoted as vt+1, is observable at no cost 
only to the entrepreneur, though all agents are assumed to know the distribution of ~ vt+1.  
After the investment returns are realized, a lender can verify the realized return on any 
project by expending e units of non-pecuniary costs (effort) per unit of investment, where 
  > 0.  Lenders are endowed with an unbounded quantity of e.  However, for each 
monitored project in which q
e
t units of goods were invested, they lose eqt units of utility 
as shown in their utility function. 
  
D. Firms
    The firms acquired by the old entrepreneurs are perfectly competitive and produce 
goods using neoclassical production technology with constant returns to scale employing 
two factors, capital and labor.  Because production technology at the firm level is 
homogeneous of degree one in the input factors, the output of goods can be described in 
terms of the action of a single, aggregate, price-taking firm.  Accordingly, the aggregate 
production function can be represented as 
           YL K k =
− − 11 δ δδ ,                                                                                               (1)  t t t t
where aggregate capital input in period t is denoted as Kt, aggregate labor input as Lt, 
aggregate output as Yt , and average per capita capital that enhances the general 
productivity level as kt.  Since this production function is linearly homogeneous, the 
technology can be expressed in per capita terms, as 
            yk k t t t    =
− δ δ 1          ( 0<δ<1),                                                                           (2) 
where k K L = represents capital per unit of labor and y Y L = is output per unit of 
labor.  Since this production function exhibits a Marshallian externality, the social 
t t t t t t
  6marginal product of capital is constant that the steady-state growth is positive and 
endogenously determined.   
     Since firms maximize profits, their demands for factors are given by the following 
first-order conditions for profit maximization. Equating the social per capita capital and 
the private per capita capital so that  k   = , we obtain  k t t  
                       w f kk f k = − = − () ' ()( ) 1 , δ †† ††   †     (3) ††        k t t t t t
and  
                       i f k = '( ) δ = ,                                                                                     (4)  t t
where it represents the rental rate of capital. Note that factor payments exhaust output 
when each factor is paid its private marginal product, because of the assumption of 
constant returns to scale with respect to private inputs.  In addition, capital is supplied by 
old entrepreneurs and labor by young lenders. 
II.  Optimal Contract 
          The form of the optimal contract in the proposed setting is now considered.   
Asymmetric information requires that the contract be incentive compatible so that the 
borrowers are honest.  This necessity results in an upper bound on the expected rate of 
return to lenders, lowers the supply of loans, and leads to credit rationing.   
     The assumption that each entrepreneur can borrow from only one lender, and vice 
versa, is not essential.  If it is relaxed and entrepreneurs can borrow from several lenders, 
financial intermediation arises endogenously as in Williamson’s model (1986).  Financial 
intermediation, however, does not in any way alter the main result of this model.  Thus, 
this assumption is imposed, and for simplicity, only the case of direct lending is 
examined.†
  7     Entrepreneurs must offer a contract to lenders in the first period so as to operate their 
investment project.  Contracts specify units of goods borrowed in the first period, 
payment in the second period, and the state when monitoring occurs.  The contract made 
between an entrepreneur and a lender is denoted by the set {qt, R vt () +1 , St+1 , where qt is 
the amount of lending, R vt ( +1)  is an integrable, positive payment function per unit of 
lending, and S   is a subset of  v  ∈ [0, 2µ ] in which verification occurs.  As an 
entrepreneur’s investment project has idiosyncratic risk and yields a random return, the 
payment must be a function of realized output.   
t+1 t+1
     As demonstrated by Williamson (1986), a standard debt contract is optimal among the 
set of all contracts (see the proof in the Appendix).  That is, the contract has the following 
properties: 
          for   
∃
+ R ,    t 1
                 R vt ( +1)  =  vt+ + 1 1 ( δ)       if  vR + + + < 1 () , δ t t 11
                              =  Rt+1                 if  vR + + + ≥ 1 () 11 , δ t
                  Sv v R ++ + + =+ < 1 {:( ) } δ ,   
t
t t t t 11 1
                  Sv v R
c
++ + + =+ ≥ 1 {:( ) } δ ,
1
t t t 11
                  qk = − () 1 δ . 
t 1 1
t t
      These properties indicate the following situations.  After entrepreneurs gain an output 
realization, vt+1, they use these goods as inputs in their firms and receive vt+ + 1 1 ( δ)  units 
of goods.   If  vt+ + 1 1 ( δ)  is equal to or larger than  Rt+1, the entrepreneur pays back  Rt+1 
units of goods to lenders, and no monitoring occurs.  On the other hand, if vt+ + 1 1 () δ  is 
less than  Rt+1, the entrepreneur cannot pay Rt+1 and become bankrupt.  In this case, 
monitoring occurs to ensure that default actually occurs, with the entrepreneur paying 
  8back all he/she can afford, namely, all the goods, vt+ + 1 1 () δ .  If bankruptcy occurs, the 
entrepreneur receives a zero return. 
t t q dv   ] 1 + µ
1 ) 1 ( + − + t δ
l
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where π  denotes the entrepreneur's expected utility and 
e π  the lender's expected second-
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                 π
l R ( +    given  t 1
θµ where  δ =+
d 21 ()   denotes the maximun return per unit of investment to an 
entrepreneur.  To characterize the solution to (3’) and (4’), it is useful to examine the 
shape of the lender's profit function π
l R ( t ) +1 .  Differentiating (4') with respect to  Rt+1 
gives 
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  9The following assumption is imposed on π
l R () t+1 . 
Assumption 1
                          1  > 0.  −
e
θ
Assumption 1 imposes a restriction on the relative size of the monitoring cost, eand the 
maximum return of investment, θ.  If assumption 1 is violated and e is larger than θ, 










1 00    and ππ )   = 0    In this case, it is not profitable for lenders to 
supply goods to entrepreneurs at any Rt+1, because e is so large, and hence, no lending 
occurs in equilibrium.  Note that assumption 1 excludes this extreme case and assures an 
equilibrium in which lending takes place.  From (8), under assumption 1, π  is 
strictly concave and reaches a maximum at some interior value, that is, 
l
t R () +1
 Rt+1
*∈ (0, θ) .  
Namely, the expected return of lenders have an upper bound due to asymmetric 
information.  A concave π
l Rt () +1   results from two different effects when    is 
increased.  One effect is that the expected return rises even if the ratio of bankrupt 
entrepreneurs remains constant.  The other is that the ratio of entrepreneurs who default 
rises.  Under assumption 1, the first effect is large when 
Rt+1
 Rt+1 is small, while the second 
one dominates the first when    is large, thereby making  Rt 1 + π
l R ( t ) +1  concave.
2   
     Define π
l
t R () +1 =+
d r 1 , and the loan supply is expressed as 











because only the proportion rt+1
* ρ of lenders actually lend their goods as explained in 
section I and each lender supplies w = − () 1 δ  units of goods.  k t t
     With this preparation, calculate the frontier of Pareto optimal π
l
t R () +1  and π
e R () + t 1  
by solving (3’) and (4’) (See figure 2).  It is given by 
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The assumption of perfect competition in capital market ensures that agents will enter into an 
optimal contract and thus end up on the contract curve, though the precise allocation depends on 
the bargaining power of the agents.  It is assumed that entrepreneurs offer a take-it-or-leave-it 
contract, and therefore have more barganing power and can lower the return of lenders to the 
reservation utility 1+ r (point F in figure 2).  This contract, however, may not be realized, as there 
is a possibility of credit rationing due to asymmetric informaion.  As shown above, there is an 
upper bound of the expected return of lenders and therefore supply of capital.  If there is large 
enough demand for capital,  there is always excess demand for capital, and lenders end up to have 
all the bargaing power, and point F cannot be the equilibrium.  Entrepreneurs must compete with 
one another to receive loans from lenders, and offer the contract corresponding to the point G in 
figure 2, where lender’s expected utitlity is maximized.   As credit rationing is widely observed in 
the deloping countries, point G is considerd to be realized in the real world and will be examined 
in this paper. 
     Proposition: An equilibrium occurs when the loan interest rate,  Rt+1
*
, the expected 




 1)   solves (3`) s.t. (4`).  Rt+1
*
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d where Q denotes the aggregate demand for capital. 
*
An equilibrium with credit rationing (point G) corrresponds to 3(b), while an equilibrium 
without rationing (point F) correspond to 3(a). As shown in Figure 1(a), π in the 
fourth quadrant represents the relationship between 
l
t R ( +1   )
Rt+1 and rt+1, where for any given 
Rt+1 , the lender's expected rate of return, 1 1 + + rt , can be determined.  In the third 
quadrant, 1 1 + + rt  is transformed to rt+1 by subtracting 1, and in the second quadrant, the 
supply curve of loanable goods is shown as a function of rt+1.   In the first quadrant, the 
supply curve of the goods is drawn as a function of Rt+1, being derived by relating R  in 
IV to Q
t+1
s in the second quadrant.  Since the loan demand is constant and independent of 
Rt+1 d , the loan demand Q  is drawn as a horizontal line.
3
     An equilibrium without credit rationing (Figure 1a) occurs when Q  is small enough, 
and Q  = Q
d
d s.  On the other hand, an equilibrium with credit rationing (Figure 1b) occurs 
when    is so large that Q Qd s  < Q  for  any  d Rt+1.  With such excess demand present, 
lenders have greater bargaining power than entrepreneurs who must offer lenders the 
highest possible profit in order to win a loan.  Therefore, as indicated in Figure 1b, E is 
the equilibrium point which corresponds to maximum π
l
t R () +1 , AE is the loan supply, 
and AB is the loan demand.  The entrepreneurs corresponding to BE cannot, therefore, 
borrow any goods.  Credit is rationed in the sense that entrepreneurs are identical ex ante, 
though some can borrow and others cannot at the rate Rt+1
*
.  As the number of lenders and 
  12entrepreneurs in each generation is equal, only the proportion r
* ρ  of borrowers can 
receive loans.   
     In this equilibrium with credit rationing, Rt+1
*
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or equivalently 
R + =−
* e t 1 θ .                                                                                                  (11) 
The equilibrium expected rate of return rt+1
*
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III.   Equilibrium with Credit Rationing 
     The equilibrium of the loan market has now been characterized using the standard debt 
contract and credit rationing. Let us now examine the equilibrium conditions in other 
markets and also the dynamics of the economy. 
     In the factor markets, labor and capital are supplied inelastically. An equilibrium arises 
when the wage and rental rate of capital are such that the respective demand and the 
supplies of labor and capital are equal.  Firms are price-takers and act competitively, 
hiring labor up to the point where the marginal product of labor is equal to the wage, and 
renting capital up to the point where the marginal product of capital is equal to the rental 
rate.  Thus, the factor market equilibrium conditions can be represented using (1) and (2). 
  13     For any period t, entrepreneurs invest goods so that their output of the investment in 
period t+1 becomes k .  Since the expected output per investment is µ and the total 
amount of invested goods is equal to the supply of the loans from lenders, capital 























δ t µ .                                          (14) 
          The dynamic behavior of the capital stock can be inferred from the capital 
accumulation equation (14).  Dividing both sides by kt gives the following growth rate 





















δµ .                                               (14') 
    Since the production function is yk k tt t    =
− δ δ 1
,  y y t t +1  equals kk t t +1  for   in 
equilibrium, and (14') gives the equilibrium rate of growth of per capita output.  It should 
be noted that this growth rate is not dependent on time and that the economy is in steady 
state after the first period.  These are the natural results of the production function which 
exhibits constant returns to the accumulatable input, k
∀t > 1
t (AK model: Rebelo. 1990).  In 
addition, the growth rate can be positive or negative depending on the size of e.   
 
IV.  The Two-Country Model 
     The previous section showed the equilibrium growth rate of a closed economy when  
credit rationing exists in the capital market.  Two countries with different levels of 
informational asymmetry are now introduced, and the effects of this difference are 
examined. 
     In developing countries, the financial market is not well developed and the effects of 
asymmetric information are more severe.  Their legal and accounting systems are also 
  14relatively primitive.  Consequently, the two-country model employed here describes a 
severely imperfect capital market since the monitoring cost eis larger in developing 
countries than in developed ones.  Although an imperfect capital market naturally causes 
many effects, for simplicity, all these effects are expressed using only the monitoring 
cost. 
     As the cost of verifying bankruptcy increases, this intuitively leads to lower returns to 
lenders resulting in the following two main effects: (1) The supply of loanable goods 
decreases, causing a reduction in available credit.  Therefore, the amount of lending is 
expected to decrease which subsequently reduces the growth rate of both per capita 
capital and income; and (2) If the two countries open their capital markets to each other, 
capital will flow into the country having a higher rate of return on investment, that is, 
capital flows into the more developed countries.   Effect  (2) can be written as the 
following proposition. 
   Proposition 1.   The expected rate of return on investment is lower in developing 
countries than in the developed countries.  Therefore, if the two countries open their 
capital markets, capital flows from the former to the latter country.
4
   Proof.    It is sufficient to prove ∂ ∂ re t+1
*    < 0.  From (13) and assumption 1, 





t+ =− + < 1 1
*
∂




     In building a two-country model, it is assumed that some cost must be incurred in 
moving capital across borders.  The cost of capital movement is expressed as ϕ() b , 




                    ϕϕ () , () 00 0 = ′ >    b , 
that is, the cost of capital movement is an increasing function of the flow of capital.  This 
cost is introduced in this model in order to prevent the unrealistic equilibrium where all 
the capital in the developing country flow into the developed country. 
     The variables in developed countries (North) are denoted by the superscript N, while 
those in developing countries (South) by S.  Thus, r
N
 is greater than r
S
 as shown in 
Proposition 1.  When the two countries open their capital markets, capital accordingly 
flows from the developing  to developed country until the following condition is satisfied: 
                rb,  r
NS −= ϕ()
*
where b  denotes the equilibrium amount of capital flows.  This condition indicates that 
the expected returns, including the cost of capital movement, must be equalized in 
equilibrium. 
     This equilibrium condition gives the amount of capital flowing from the developing  
countries to the developed countries.  Next, let us consider the growth rates of output in 
each economy.  As stated earlier, even when no capital flows exist, the growth rate of 
output is higher in the developed country because its domestic loan supply is larger due to 
the less severe effects of informational asymmetry.  Another effect which occurs when 
the two countries open their capital markets is that the growth rates diverge even more as 
a result of international capital movement as shown by the following proposition. 
         
     Proposition 2.    Due to international capital flows and the more severe effects of 
asymmetric information in developing countries, the growth rate of per capita output in 
  16these countries is comparatively lower which causes per capita income to diverge.  Such a 
divergence is contrary to the prediction from neoclassical theory. 
     Proof :    When international capital flows are present, the supply of loanable goods in 






















δ ,                                                                                            (16) 
where the first and second terms on the right hand side of (15) are, respectively, the 
domestic loan supply and the capital supplied from abroad.  In the South, the lenders with 
  supply their goods to domestic entrepreneurs as before, while those with  ρ≤r
S
rr S N << ρ   supply their goods to entrepreneurs in the North.  In autarky, the latter 
lenders consume their goods in the first period.  Consequently, the opening of the capital 
market increases the supply of loanable funds to the North without decreasing that in the 
South.  The dynamic behavior of k  in each country is expressed by  t
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, which represents the effect of credit rationing.  Moreover, the second term in 
  17(15) is positive and represents the effect of international capital flows.  Therefore, the 
growth rate of the developed country is relatively larger.                                         Q.E.D. 
     If we consider the welfare property of the dynamic equilibrium, it is also possible to 




     This paper has explained the empirical findings that sufficient capital does not flow 
from developed to developing countries, and their income levels do not converge.  If the 
capital markets in developing countries suffer more severely from asymmetric 
information, their rate of returns on investment become lower and severer credit rationing 
occurs in these countries.  As a result, capital flows from developing to developed 
countries, lowering the investment and growth rates in the developing countries.  This 
paper’s contribution lies in clarifying the relationship between the credit rationing caused 
by imperfect capital markets, international capital flows, and growth rates.  
     The theory proposed suggests that policies which promote the development of the 
capital markets in developing countries are needed in order to increase capital inflows and 
improve economic growth.  The establishment of a better and more advanced legal and 
accounting systems are two examples of these policies.  
     In earlier papers, many other factors have been suggested as explanatory factors for varying 
growth performances across countries and for why capital flows in particular directions.  This 
paper has provided a plausible theoretical explanation for the simultaneous findings that per capita 
income across countries do not exhibit convergence and capital does not flow to developing 
  18countries in large enough quantities.  Whether the credit rationing explanation suggested in this 





1 After controlling for the level of human capital, the initial level of GDP, and other economic 
factors, conditional convergence is supported by some empirical research (Barro, 1991; Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992).  This indicates that we must consider several other factors 
influencing growth rates.  Consequently, this paper examines the effects of capital market 
imperfections on growth (Bencivenga and Smith, 1991, 1993; Levine, 1992; Cohen, 1992; 
King and Levine, 1993; Pagano, 1993). 
2 On the other hand,  ( 1 + t
e R π )  is strictly decreasing in  1 + t R  over the range  1 + t R [] . , 0 θ ∈  
3  Q  is assumed to be constant for simplicity. This is not, however, an essential assumption 
because the loan demand which depends on 
d
1 + t R  does not alter the equilibrium as long as Q  
is large enough to cause credit rationing. 
d
4 This effect of an imperfect capital market is contrary to the standard effect of a diminishing 
marginal product of capital which causes capital flows from developed to developing 
countries.  In the presented model, the marginal product of capital is constant and only the 
effects of asymmetric information are considered in this proposition.  In the real world, 
however, both these factors and others, for example, political risk have influences.  As a 
result, the direction of the flow of capital is jointly determined by all these factors. 
  19Appendix 
     The form of the optimal contract is considered here using a proof following along the 
lines of Williamson (1986) and Hamada and Sakuragawa (1992).  It is subsequently 
shown that the optimal contract is a standard debt contract. 
          First, consider the optimal level of lending qt.  In section I, the lender鉳 utility 
function and their behavior are explained.  It is optimal for any lender to lend all their 
goods to entrepreneurs in order to maximize utility if the market interest rate is higher 
than his/her rate of time preference.  Thus, the amount of goods each lender supplies is 
equal to all the goods received as wage wt.  Since a lender is endowed with one unit of 
labor and the wage rate is () 1−δ kt as given by Equation (1), each lender's wage is equal 
to () 1−δ kt, that is, qk =− () 1 δ .   t t
      After the realization of the investment project, vt+1, the entrepreneurs start firms and 
obtain vt+ + 1 1 ( δ)  units of goods, and then send a signal vt
d
+1 to the lender.  Because the 
contract specifies the range when monitoring occurs, S ⊂[, ] 02 µ , the payment 
schedule can be written as 
t+1
                        RH v i f v S
d = ∈ + + + () ,            t t t 11




t () , + , + + ∉ 11 1               
, 1
where  H vt ( + ) 1   is the payment schedule when monitoring occurs and Kv t
d ( + ) 1
1
 is  the 
payment schedule when monitoring does not occur.  These functions satisfy the following 
feasibility conditions: 
                        0 ≤ ≤ + ++ H v v () ( ) , δ                  †        ††              (A1)  11 t t
                        01 11 ≤ ≤ + ++ Kv v t
d
t () ( ) . δ         †                                                   (A2)                    
     When  entrepreneurs  choose  vS t
d
t + + ∉ 11 ,   naturally they will choose vt
d
+1  which 
minimizes the payment because no monitoring occurs, that is, 










* argmin ( ).   v + 1
Thus, the payment is constant with no monitoring, that is, 








min ( ).   v + 1
     Next H vt () +1  is characterized.  The function H vt (  must be incentive compatible, 
namely, it satisfies the following conditions: 
) +1
                    vS i f H v R
d
++ + + ∈ <            ( ) ,†† †† ††   t tt 11 1
vv i f H v R
d d
++ t t tt + + = ≥
* ()            11 1 1 ,                                                         (A5) 
t 1
            and 
                   vS o r vv i f H v R
d d d
++ + t tt t tt + + + ∈= =                  
* ()                11 1 1 1 . 1
     These  conditions  determine  St+1   as a function of H vt () +1  and  Rt+1 : 
Sv H vR v H vR ttt t
c
ttt ++ S t + + + + + + =< = ≥ 111 1 111 {: () } {: () }  and  1 .    Hence, the optimal 
contract is specified as {, . ( ) } qH v + , R ttt + 11    
     The set of Pareto optimal contracts can be derived from the following maximizing 
problem, 
      
∫ ∫ + + + + + − + + − + =
+ +
c
1 + t 1 + t 1 1 S 1 1 1 + t S 1 1 1 + t 1
e
) ), ( ( 2
1
} ) 1 ( {v
2
1
)} ( ) 1 ( {v ) (     max t t t t t
R v H






                  ∫ ∫ + + + + + + − =
c




] ) ( [ ) (    t t t t t
l dv R dv e v H R
µ µ
π s.t. .                   
(A7) 
                              π
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Proof.   Suppose not, and that (( ) , ′ ) ′ + + Hv R  is the optimal contract.  Let  tt 11
              ′ = ′ < ′′ = ′ ≥ ′ + + + + + + + + Bv .   H vR Bv H vR
c {:() } {:() }  and  tt t t ttt t 11 1 1 11 1 1
Then from (A7),  
                   ∫ ∫ ′ + + ′ + + + ′ + − ′ =
c




] ) ( [ ) ( t t t t d t
l dv R dv e v H R
µ µ
π . 
Now consider another payment schedule  ′′ + H vt ( 1)  with  ′′ + H vt () 1 ≥ ′ + H vt ( 1)  for  all 
vt+ ∈+ 1 02 1 [, ( ) ]   µ δ ,  ′′ > ′ + + H v H v t t () ( 1 ) 1  for  some  v B t+ ∈ ′ 1 , and  ′′ + H vt () 1  
continuous and monotone increasing on [, ( 02 1 ) ] µ δ + .  Then, there is some  ′′ R  with 
0< ′′ < ′ R R  such that 
                  ∫ ∫ ′ ′ + + ′ ′ + + + ′ ′ + − ′ ′ =
c




] ) ( [ ) ( t t t t d t
l dv R dv e v H R
µ µ
π  
                  ′′ = ′′ < ′′ ′′ = ′′ ≥ ′′ ++ + + + + + + H vR Bv H vR
c {: () } {: () }   and    Bv .   tt t t t tt t 11 1 1 1 1 1 1
The change in the objective function in (A6) as the result of changing the contract from 
(( ) , ′′ ++ Hv R  to (() , ′′ ′′ + ) + Hv R  is  ) tt 11 tt 11






1 + t 1 + t B 1 B 1 > +∫ ∫ ′ ′ + ′ + t t dv dv
µ µ
e , 
as  ′′ ⊂ ′ B B  and  ′− ′′ ≠ B B φ.  We therefore have a contradiction.    Q.E.D. 
 
The proof of the proposition follows Williamson (1986).  This proposition indicates that 
the optimal contract is a debt contract.  In other words, either the entrepreneur pays back 
the fixed payment R , or defaults and pays all output v t 1 t + + + 1 ) 1 ( δ  and receives a zero 
return.    
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